By skyforbes 
The TikTok Breakup: How Washington Is Forcing a U.S. Spin-Off & China’s Soybean — How U.S. Farmers Got Ghosted
Just between the China and US, battles between social media ban and commodities threats seems to make the trade relations more juicy. Let’s delve in.
This September, President Trump signed an executive order declaring that the proposed separation of TikTok’s U.S. operations from its Chinese parent, ByteDance, satisfies the legal requirements of a 2024 U.S. law. The valuation assigned to the transaction was $14 billion, and the move comes after a long standoff over data, trust, and national security.
The legal foundation for this conflict is the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), enacted in April 2024. That law explicitly designated TikTok (and other ByteDance apps) as a “foreign adversary controlled application,” mandating a divestiture or face removal from U.S. app stores and hosting networks by January 19, 2025.
TikTok and ByteDance challenged the law on multiple fronts, asserting that forced divestiture would violate constitutional protections of free speech and due process. The case, consolidated as TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, reached the Supreme Court, which in January 2025 issued a per curiam ruling upholding the act as constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.
Despite the legal mandate, enforcement was delayed multiple times. The Trump administration granted extensions and forbearance, allowing technical negotiations and structuring to proceed. (Reuters) At the same time, U.S. and Chinese officials engaged in delicate negotiation over how much control, data, and algorithmic linkage ByteDance might retain under a reconfigured model. (Reuters)
Under the deal framework now certified by the executive order, a newly formed U.S. entity will operate TikTok’s American operations. U.S. investors led by Oracle, Silver Lake, and others, are expected to hold approximately 80 % of the equity, with ByteDance and its existing shareholders holding less than 20 %. ByteDance will be excluded from Board control in security-related decisions; the new board is to consist of seven seats, six held by Americans, one by ByteDance.
A central feature of the arrangement is the separation or licensing of the core recommendation algorithm and the retraining of algorithmic models on U.S. data. The idea is to sever ByteDance’s influence over content curation and user profiling, while allowing a “front end” linkage to commerce or advertising systems to remain.
Yet the structure is unknown. Some reports suggest ByteDance may still control the advertising and e-commerce components of the U.S. app, giving it influence over monetization even if it loses influence over algorithmic control.
The valuation raises further questions. The app’s U.S. business was valued at $14 billion in the executive order, a number many people believe understates intrinsic value some analysts pegged ByteDance’s overall valuation at over $330 billion in 2025. The delta invites scrutiny regarding who captures the upside in future growth, and how much value is ceded to the Chinese side under restructuring terms.
The deal is also being monitored by regulatory bodies, including CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States), to ensure it qualifies as a “qualified divestiture” under law. If ByteDance’s residual influence is judged excessive, TikTok could still be blocked.
From financial markets perspective, investor optimism is high. Oracle shares responded positively to the announcement, and the deal has drawn major capital interest. But skepticism persists among analysts and legislators alike, who worry that ByteDance’s retained profit share, algorithm licensing, or residual influence could undermine the spirit of a full separation.
Politically, the structure will face heavy scrutiny in Congress. Some members argue that a licensing arrangement is insufficient to insulate against foreign influence. Others worry about censorship, content moderation, and free speech liabilities under the new governance. The deal must survive not only legal test but ongoing political oversight.
China’s Soybean — How U.S. Farmers Got Ghosted
China has not booked a single cargo of U.S. soybeans for the new crop year. Historically the largest buyer of U.S. soy, China has pivoted entirely to South American suppliers.
That absence has material implications not just for U.S. farmers, but for trade leverage, commodity pricing, and the broader balance of agricultural diplomacy.
For decades, soybean exports have served as an anchor in U.S.–China trade relations. American farmers relied heavily on Chinese demand, and China’s massive livestock sector depended on U.S. soy for feed. Tariff wars launched under the Trump administration disrupted that balance, as China imposed retaliatory tariffs and diversified its supplier base.
During the 2023–24, China accounted for over half of U.S. soybean exports, purchasing approximately $13.2 billion in volume. But in 2025, as trade stances hardened, China has not made new U.S. bookings preferring to secure 7.4 million metric tons from South American producers, particularly Argentina and Brazil, to cover October shipments.
Contributing to the shift is China’s 2025 retaliatory tariff structure on U.S. soy, now pushing overall import duty to around 34 %. Given these impediments, Chinese buyers have opted for Brazilian and Argentine supply even if transport costs are higher.
China’s avoidance of U.S. soy is very strategic. By withholding demand, Beijing applies pressure to U.S. policymakers to reconsider tariffs, negotiate trade concessions, or prioritize agricultural diplomacy. China’s state media and trade negotiators signal that reengagement will require removal or mitigation of “unreasonable” U.S. tariffs.
On the supply side, Argentine and Brazilian producers are aggressively scaling exports. Reports suggest China may import up to 10 million metric tons from those two countries during the 2025/26 season. That not only fills the void left by U.S. absence but positions South America as the default provider in a reshaped market.
The market impact is already manifest. Benchmark Chicago soybean futures are near multi-year lows as U.S. export demand collapses. Storage costs are rising, inventories piling up, and price margins tightening.
On the farm economics side, a recent academic study modeled the impact of China’s retaliatory tariffs, showing significant downward pressure on U.S. soybean prices, compressed farm incomes, and acreage reallocations in subsequent seasons. (arXiv) The trade gap is already evident: U.S. soybean exporters are projecting billions in lost sales. A number of farm associations are petitioning the White House to engineer a purchase deal with China. (Reuters)
At the macro level, this underscores how agricultural commodities can be weaponized. China’s decision to suspend purchases is a deliberate lever in its broader trade strategy, one that extends beyond economics into diplomacy and economic coercion.
For futures markets and agribusiness, volatility will likely intensify. Any signs of renewed Chinese bookings could spark sudden rebounds. Conversely, continued cold shoulder from Beijing may push more U.S. exporters out of global competition.
Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers might deploy emergency subsidies or export guarantees to sustain farmers. But such measures risk distortion, fiscal strain, and long-term dependency.
Finally, Brazilian and Argentine supply dynamics is something to look at. If their production or logistics are challenged, reliance on U.S. soy might become inevitable even for China.
Sources:
Reuters